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Globalization, Institutions of Social Solidarity, and Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe

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Abstract

We rejoin the question of whether globalization contributes to the electoral success of the radical populist right in Western Europe. We also advance and test the hypothesis that institutions of social solidarity directly weaken support for the radical right and moderate the electoral impact of globalization. In empirical analysis of national elections in 16 European polities from 1981 to 2015, we find that merchandise imports from developing nations, capital mobility, and, especially, inflows of refugees and asylum seekers are positively associated with the radical right-wing populist party vote. In addition, a universalistic welfare state directly depresses the vote for radical right-wing populist parties and conditions the linkages between immigration on the one hand, and electoral support for the radical populist right on the other. We also find that employment protection laws and encompassing, centralized union movements mitigate the positive effects of economic globalization and immigration on national vote shares of right-wing populist parties. In conclusion, we consider our findings’ implications for understanding the domestic political effects of globalization and sources of right-wing populism. We also reflect on the potentially significant, indirect effect of globalization on political instability that comes through international liberalization’s adverse impacts on institutions of social solidarity.

During the past four decades, radical right-wing populist (RRWP) parties have garnered 10 percent or more of the national parliamentary vote in roughly two thirds of Western European polities. The emergence and notable growth of the radical populist right since the early 1980s has occurred concomitantly with significant increases in international integration, deindustrialization, and the rise of "post-materialist" values and policy orientations. In this paper, we extend our past work (Swank and Betz 2003) on the relationship between globalization and the electoral success of RRWP parties. Specifically, in our earlier work we analyzed the impacts of trade openness, capital mobility, and immigration as well as the direct and mediating roles of a universalistic welfare state on the parliamentary vote shares of RRWP parties in the 16 largest West European nations between 1981 and 1998. In our current study, we extend the temporal range to 1981 to 2015. We add to the analysis a consideration of the argument that solidaristic institutions – a universalistic welfare state, employment security laws, encompassing and centralized union
organization, and corporatist policy-making structures -- institutions that lesson economic insecurities, moderate the pernicious effects of perceived declines of social status, and otherwise promote norms of fairness and social justice, should directly weaken support for RRWP parties and moderate the electoral impacts of globalization.

The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we present our theoretical arguments while in the second part we delineate alternative explanations and general empirical models of the RRWP party vote; in the third section, we offer methodological details and in the fourth part we report the results of statistical tests of our hypotheses. In the conclusions, we discuss our analyses’ contributions to an understanding of the domestic political consequences of internationalization, the determinants of the electoral fortunes of the new far right, and the importance of institutions of social solidarity in easing the structural transformation of West European economies.

GLOBALIZATION, SOLIDARISTIC INSTITUTIONS, AND THE NEW FAR RIGHT

To begin, we might offer a more precise overview of the electoral record of the radical populist right. Table 1 lists principal RRWP parties by country and reports average decennial parliamentary election results for the period of 1981 to 2015. For the major West European nations included in our study, RRWP parties have won significant vote shares in 13 of the 16 countries. In seven of these 13 cases, they have approached or exceeded 20 percent of the national vote in at least one election. On occasion, they have reached or surpassed the 25 percent mark (e.g. Austrian Freedom Party [FPÖ], the Belgium Vlaams Block ([VN], Swiss People’s Party [SVP]). With a few exceptions (e.g., the Scandinavian Progress parties in the1970s), new radical right parties became electorally consequential in the 1980s and have experienced increasing levels of support throughout the last three decades.
Contemporary radical right-wing populist parties derive their distinct identity from an ideational composite that combines a populist discourse with a variety of nativist narratives (Betz 2017; 2018). In fact, a recent influential introduction to populism notes that the contemporary radical right is best characterized as a "nativist populist radical right" (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 35). For the purpose of the present analysis, we understand populism as a political doctrine that holds that society is divided into two antagonistic blocs: on the one side ordinary people (the "low"), on the other a relatively small elite (the "high") that not only systematically ignores and even goes against the expressed will of ordinary people but more often than not denigrates their values and aspirations and has nothing but contempt for them (Betz 2018). Populism not only claims to restore voice to the people and subject politics to the will of the people, but also to validate ordinary people and their common sense (Jansen 2001. 83).

Nativism stands for a "complex web of nationalism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism and racism" that informs a variety of narratives (Anbinder 1992, xiv). In a broad sense, nativism refers to an "expressed partiality to the native-born and their culture in preference to the foreign-born" on the simple grounds that they are native (Loucks 1936, 1). Government is supposed to show partiality towards the native-born, who should be granted absolute priority to the benefits and privileges that citizenship accords. In a narrower sense, nativism is a doctrine that holds that a nation is an organically grown entity, defined by its particular history, a historically evolved culture and system of mores and values that must be protected and defended. Politically, nativism finds its most important expressions in welfare chauvinism, support for ethnocracy and "… First" policies, and the denial of rights to non-natives on the grounds of cultural incompatibility. In terms of political communication, nativism is reflected in some of these parties' best-known slogans, such as Les français d'abord (The French first, Front national) or
Nativism is central to the focus of the present study. For one, it directly relates to the emergence of a major new cleavage in advanced liberal democracies – cosmopolitanism vs. communitarianism/parochialism. This new cleavage, in turn, is directly related to globalization – more precisely, voters’ perceptions of the socioeconomic and sociocultural impact of globalization on their individual lives (Azmanova 2011; Zürn and de Wilde 2016; Teney, Lacewell and de Wilde 2014). Those who benefit from the new opportunities globalization engenders tend to harbor a cosmopolitan outlook; those who see themselves disadvantaged by globalization tend to hold on to parochial views. This polarization, as will be shown further below, is also to a large extent reflected in the sociostructural composition of radical populist right's electoral constituencies.

Successful radical right-wing populist parties appeal to the whole span of the electorate, from retirees to young people in education and training, from the full-time employed to the unemployed. In this sense, they represent a new version of catch-all parties of protest. At the same time, however, not all social aggregates come out in support for these parties equally. In the initial phase of radical right-wing populist mobilization, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, support for prominent parties such as the Front national and the Scandinavian Progress parties was largely concentrated among the traditional middle class, farmers, and the self-employed. This was hardly surprising, given these parties' Thatcherite neoliberal program. With the proliferation of radical right-wing populist parties during the 1990s and their growing electoral success, the composition of their constituencies started to shift. With growing numbers of semi- and unskilled workers supporting these parties, academic observers increasingly noted
the progressive "proletarization" of their electoral base -- a notion already introduced by Pascal Perrineau with respect to the Front national in the late 1980s (Perrineau 1988, 25). A study of the Danish and Norwegian parties advanced similar conclusions. What differentiated these parties was the fact that they recruited disproportionate support from working-class voters; this meant that they constituted "an increasingly 'natural' alternative for working-class voters" (Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 1990, 214). Subsequent studies of the sociostructural base of these parties largely confirmed the transformation of their constituencies. The dramatic gains of the Austrian FPÖ in the 1990s under the new leadership of Jörg Haider was largely owed to the massive influx of (male) working-class voters, which transformed the FPÖ into Austria's premier Arbeiterpartei, as even Haider's most vocal critics conceded (Plasser and Ulram 2000, 232; Pelinka 2002, 285).

Some thirty years later, nothing has fundamentally changed. In the most recent parliamentary election in Austria, for instance, more than 50 percent of working-class voters supported the FPÖ, significantly ahead of the socialists, who only gained a fifth of their vote (SORA 2017). Western Europe's most recent addition to the RRWP family, the German AfD (Alternative for Germany) which in the federal election of 2017 garnered more than 12 percent of the vote, attracts a similar constituency: in 2016, more than a third of working class voters said they would vote AfD (DIW 2017, 598). Similarly in France, the progression of the Front national and its president, Marine Le Pen, in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2012 and 2017 was largely owed to Marine Le Pen's appeal to the lower classes (couches populaires) -- manual and routine workers, skilled and unskilled -- who make up the majority of the party's constituency (Betz 2015).
One interesting and potentially consequential change in ideological and programmatic orientation of RRWP parties has been increased support for the maintenance or expansion of the traditional welfare state (see the general upward trend in manifesto statements in favor of welfare expansion in the platforms of the major RRWP parties in Appendix Figure 1). We have to note, however, two important caveats to this point. First, as widely recognized, RRWP parties have universally expressed welfare chauvinism where parties consistently argue social benefits and services should be highly restricted for non-natives. Second, and less appreciated, there is some notable heterogeneity in the degree of welfare state support among these parties. As Lefkofridi and Michel (2017) have noted, a shift from domestic neoliberalism to welfare expansion is most pronounced among the radical populist right in France and the Scandinavia countries; it is much less so, for instance, in the case of the Austria FPÖ, Belgian VB, and Swiss SVP.¹

Theory: The Electoral Impacts of Globalization

As is well known, West European nations have experienced significant international integration of markets since the 1960s. Facilitated by the reduction in transactions costs through technological changes, new institutions, and liberalization of transnational exchange, annual trade in goods and services in the 16 largest West European nations (see Table 1) grew from a national average of 61% of GDP in 1980 to 73% in 1998, and to 96% in 2015. Similar increases have occurred in the substantively important category of imports of goods from (non-oil exporting) developing economies have occurred (from 11 to 17 percent of GDP between 1980 and 2015).² Moreover, the typical West European economy has experienced a dramatic

¹ The trend among RRWP parties’ statements of support for neoliberalism more broadly conceived has also modestly declined over the years (see Appendix Figure 2). However, a survey of recent manifestos makes clear that these parties still support tax cuts, efficiency in government and related neoliberal policies.

² See the Appendix for descriptions and sources for all data discussed in this and subsequent sections. On imports from the developing world, many recent studies have shown that the driving component in this area – imports for China – have had especially important economic and political impacts in the advanced political economies (e.g., Autor et al 2016; Colantone and Stanig 2018).
expansion of capital openness. Annual average flows of foreign direct investment for the typical nation have increased from roughly one to 10 percent of GDP between 1980 and 2015; similar growth has been observed for portfolio investment and bank lending as well as the removal of capital controls themselves.

In addition, increasingly large inflows of culturally diverse immigrants have occurred for several decades throughout Western Europe. By 1980, the foreign resident share of West Europe societies averaged five percent of the population; despite significant new restrictions on inflows of immigrants, this share increased to seven percent on average by 1999 and to roughly 10 percent by 2015. Refugees and asylum seekers account for an important component of the 1980s to 2010s rise in foreign populations: inflows of asylum seekers and refugees (in our 16 focal nations) averaged 100,000 annually in the early 1980s and over 400,000 per year in the 2010 to 2015 period. By 2017, roughly 11.5 percent of the typical European labor force was composed of foreign-born workers. What are the consequences of these trends for support of the radical populist right?

**Economics.** Theory and research on the economic impacts of globalization stress that transnationally mobile manufacturing and financial enterprises as well as highly skilled professionals, technical personnel, and managers are the “winners” of internationalization. Globalization of markets, however, generates losses and new economic insecurities for some occupational strata and sectors (e.g., Rodrik 1997; 2018). Specifically, Heckscher-Ohlin/Stolper-Samuelson models predict that semi- and unskilled workers bear significant costs with the globalization of developed economies. That is, models of factor price convergence suggest that the relative prices commanded by comparatively scarce factors in the developed economies

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3 Computations of averages of stocks of foreign immigrants are based on eleven major nations for which data are consistently available: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
(semi- and unskilled workers) decline with internationalization as the relative demand for comparatively abundant factors (high skilled workers) increases.\textsuperscript{4} Together, trade, capital mobility, and immigration of workers may contribute to the decline in the relative wages and employment of increasing numbers of lower skilled workers. In addition, the traditional middle class may be economically disadvantaged (as well as face threats to traditional institutions, values, and status). As Jeffry Frieden (1991, p. 426) has argued: “...in the developed world, financial integration favors capitalists with mobile or diversified assets and disfavors those with assets tied to specific locations and activities such as manufacturing and farming.” That is, from the perspective of Ricardo-Viner models, internationalization’s effects are also sector-specific. Finally, Rodrik (1997) and others have argued that while internationalization is dominated to a degree by North-North flows in Western Europe, it has also resulted in rises in the demand elasticity for wage earners (as workers, for instance, in France, Germany, and Sweden become more ready substitutes for each other in response to price changes). Thus, employment, wages, and consumption may become more volatile as globalization increases.

There is substantial debate, however, about whether or not globalization is the main cause of the decline of relative wages and employment of lower skilled workers. In the well-known studies by Wood (1994; 1995) the author estimates that trade is responsible for a 21.5 percent decline in the demand for lower skilled workers in developed economies. However, a large literature emerged that stressed skilled-biased technological change and related features of domestic economic transformation were probably more important than globalization in explaining the economic decline of semi- and unskilled workers. Yet, in a review of the more recent literature (such as the well-known study of the impacts of Chinese imports by Autor and colleagues [2013]), Rodrik (2018) notes that the pendulum of causal responsibility has swung

\textsuperscript{4} For a theoretical overview of these models, see Frieden and Rogowski (1996) and Rodrik (2018), among others.
back toward globalization. Overall, despite questions on the precise role of globalization, international integration should contribute to the inclination of some voters to support parties that oppose internationalism and offer clear programmatic solutions to associated problems; this seems particularly likely if perceptions of burdens of globalization exceed its perceived benefits.

**Perceptions and Politics.** In the 1990s, the OECD (1994) suggested that there appears to be a relatively widespread belief among electorates that internationalization plays a significant role in adverse economic outcomes. More recently, a Pew Global Attitudes Survey published shortly before the 2008 financial crisis concluded that there were "signs that enthusiasm for economic globalization is waning in the West — Americans and Western Europeans are less supportive of international trade and multinational companies than they were five years ago." At the same time, however, the authors of the study noted that the results revealed "an evolving world view on globalization that is nuanced, ambivalent, and sometimes inherently contradictory" (Pew 2007, 1). This is still the case a decade later.

Academic studies shed light on this ambivalence. Indeed, in one of the most exhaustive analyses to date, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) have examined the perceptions of American workers about the costs and benefits of globalization and, in turn, workers’ policy preferences; in

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5 Generally, expansions of trade may be accompanied by popular perceptions that economic performance problems arise from increasing imports from countries that practice "unfair competition." Moreover, dramatic rises in capital mobility and anecdotal media reports of the relocation of production may lead to beliefs that outflows of investment contribute to large job losses. These perceptions may be reinforced by the view that internationalization fosters a loss of national autonomy over economic policies and inflows of foreigners that, in turn, contribute to economic difficulties.

6 Recent survey evidence suggests that among significant portions of the public there is considerable skepticism about globalization in general and the wisdom of trade openness in particular, even in countries that benefit from it. At the same time, public opinion surveys also show that the public is split, if not polarized, on the issue (Bussière et al. 2010, 27). In a recent study of public opinion in the member countries of the EU, commissioned by the German Bertelsmann Foundation, 45 percent of respondents saw globalization as a threat, 55 percent as a chance (de Vries and Hoffmann 2016, 13). A comparative study of five major advanced capitalist countries (France, Germany, Italy, UK and USA) examining public opinion on the opening of trade with emerging economies such as China and India comes to similar conclusions. Whereas a majority of respondents generally consider it a "good thing" a significant minority (ranging from 15 percent for the UK to 33 percent for France and Italy) hold the opposite view (ifop 2018).
summarizing their findings, Scheve and Slaughter (2001, p. 9) note:

...the majority also have concerns about these [international] transactions, in particular their adverse labor marker impacts. On balance, more people seem to weigh these costs as more important than the benefits, such that...they respond with preferences for policies aimed at less, not more, liberalization of trade, immigration, and FDI. ... Less-skilled individuals, measured by educational attainment or wages earned, are much more likely to oppose freer trade and immigration than their more-skilled counterparts.

Mayda and Rodrik (2005) draw similar conclusions for the developed democracies as a whole from their analysis of International Social Survey Program and World Values Survey data. They conclude that a majority of citizens in the typical developed democracy supports restricting trade and that these protectionist attitudes vary systematically with education and occupational levels.7 In more recent work, Scheve and Slaughter (2002) complement their earlier findings and the research by Mayda and Rodrik (2005) by demonstrating the existence of a direct linkage between exposure to foreign direct investment and workers’ perceptions of economic insecurity.

As we argued in our earlier study (Swank and Betz 2003), RRWP parties have commonly targeted electoral appeals to those who face economic uncertainties if not losses in the wake of Europeanization, globalization and domestic change, and to those who possess diffuse anxieties, fears, and resentments in the wake of socioeconomic structural transition. Indeed, a survey of recent election manifestos of the major RRWP parties reveals that these parties near universally attack the economic and cultural threats posed by Europeanization and immigration (see Appendix). But, while some parties single out the costs of trade liberalization and capital mobility (e.g., the French FN), others are more inclined to support free trade (German AfD, Norwegian Progress Party, and Swedish Democrats). Overall, the RWWP parties’ core constituencies and the parties, themselves, express some ambivalence on the specific issue of liberalization versus protectionism.

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7 See Gabel (1998) on attitudes toward capital, trade, and immigration within the context of a formative period of European Union-building; that research reaches broadly similar conclusions.
As theory predicts, survey research shows that voters who hold negative views on globalization are drawn to radical right-wing parties. In Austria, for instance, about 70 percent of FPÖ supporters view globalization as a threat (de Vries and Hoffmann 2016, 20). When it comes to trade openness specifically, the results are more differentiated, however. In France, for instance, the number of Marine Le Pen supporters (in the presidential election of 2017) who consider trade openness bad for the country (41 percent) is about the same as the number of those who hold the opposite view (42 percent; ifop 2018, 22).

Generally, the radical populist right’s position on trade openness is ambivalent. One of the notions central to European radical right-wing populist discourse – together with identity – is sovereignty, which largely explains these parties’ pronounced hostility toward the European Union. The Swiss People’s Party (SVP), for instance, which within a decade advanced to become the largest party in the Swiss party system, has derived its success at the polls to a large extent from its categorical rejection of Swiss membership in the EU in the name of preserving the country’s long history of independence and sovereignty. At the same time, however, the SVP is a staunch advocate of trade openness. For good reasons: trade openness is essential to the Swiss economy, given the relatively small size of the country’s internal market. The same holds true for a number of EU members, such as the Scandinavian countries, but also for the exemplary “trading state” – Germany.

The radical populist right's position on trade is informed by what is generally known as "economic nationalism." Economic nationalism does not necessarily imply protectionism. In fact, in Western Europe, only a few parties, such as the fringe British National Party (BNP), have strongly espoused protectionism to revitalize domestic manufacturing in the face of globalization pressures (Griffin 2007, 254). RRWP parties generally have a significantly more nuanced
position on trade, in line with the logic of economic nationalism. As Shulman, Helleiner and others have argued, if national is defined as the "promotion of the autonomy, unity and identity of the nation" (Shulman 2000, 365), it "can be associated with a range of policy projects, including the endorsement of liberal economic policies" (Helleiner 2002, 307).

Despite complexities raised by the overview of attitudes and party positions on trade, the evidence suggests that globalization and its attendant problems are likely strong correlates of support for RRWP parties. For instance, Mughan et al (2003) and Guiso et al (2017) find individual-level economic insecurity in advanced capitalist political economies contributes to the propensity to support the radical populist right. Country studies have recently shown that in nations such as Germany economic conditions associated with trade integration (Dippel et al 2015) and fear of globalization (Betz and Habersack 2018) are correlated with individual support for RRWP parties. In our earlier work on the topic (Swank and Betz 2003), we found that volumes of merchandise trade, inflows of asylum seekers and refugees, and capital mobility were all positive associated with the share of the national vote won by RWWP parties in the 1980s and 1990s. Recently, Colantone and Stanig (2018) have reported that the magnitude of the Chinese import shock across subnational regions in Western European nations is associated with support for economic nationalism (including protectionism) and the radical right party vote.

Generally, we tend to agree with Oesch and Rennwald (2018), Rodrik (2018), and similar thinkers who have stressed the importance of cultural conflict enlivened by the challenge of contemporary economic conditions. Daniel Oesch and Line Rennwald, for instance, in a recent

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8 This relationship has been contested in the literature. Simon Bornschier and Hanspeter Kriesi, for instance, find in their study of working class politics that "economic marginalization and job insecurity play no role in determining the vote for the parties." Genuine losers of modernization just don't vote and are therefore unavailable for mobilization. "The typical extreme right voter disposes of an intermediate level of education, belongs to the manual working class, and is not disinterested in politics" (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013, 26). Guiso et al (2017) also note that economic insecurity tends to depress turnout.
empirical work on the changing face of electoral competition in Europe argue that whereas the popular classes' (i.e., production and service workers) economic attitudes might be closer to the left, their "cultural preferences are in closer accordance with the radical right" (Oesch and Rennwald 2018, 18). And it is these cultural attitudes (particularly on the question of identity) that ultimately tip the scale in favor of the radical populist right. These cultural attitudes are intricately linked to transnational migration, be it for economic and environmental reasons or for reasons of violence and political persecution. Migration, in turn, provokes a number of responses from the native-born, ranging from resentment of the fact that migrants seem to receive preferential treatment with regard to social services (giving rise to welfare chauvinism) to anxieties over the perceived threats to national identity from migrants with a fundamentally different cultural background. This explains why prominent radical right-wing populist parties in Europe have made the question of Islam's place in society a central campaign issue (Betz 2017).

As Rodrik (2018) suggests, radical populist right parties have not systematically employed protectionist and anti-capital mobility rhetoric to mobilize those experiencing economic insecurities and losses, perceived declines in social status, and discontent with extant institutions and parties. Instead, they most consistently mobilize these voters by associating job loss, rising economic risks, threats to social protection and public services, and national identity and culture with immigration, especially increasing numbers of non-European immigrants and refugees. In this formulation, RRWP do not primarily and consistently exploit an economic cleavage between “losers” in postindustrial society and economic elites; they exploit a largely cultural cleavage between immigrants and natives, a cleavage we would argue is given force by
socioeconomic context of insecurity and decline.9

We now turn to an exposition of our central argument: support for the RRWP parties generally, and the magnitude of the electoral impact of trade openness, capital mobility, and immigration specifically, are likely to be significantly influenced by the strength of the institutions of social solidarity.

Theory: The Role of Solidaristic Institutions

The domestic political impacts of globalization may be generally manifest across West European polities; alternatively, these impacts may vary in magnitude and direction with domestic institutional contexts. Institutional contexts that mitigate economic insecurity across the population, lesson the more pernicious consequences of a perceived loss of social status, and foster broadly accepted norms of social equality and justice should be especially important. We refer to institutions that promote these outcomes as solidaristic institutions.10

National Welfare States. National systems of social protection seem particularly relevant to our central questions. In the post-World War II era, the welfare state has been regarded as an integral feature of embedded liberalism: in the most open economies, encompassing networks of social protection have buffered workers from the vicissitudes of liberalized international markets and, thus, promoted economic and political stability (e.g., Ruggie 1982; Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 1985). As Garrett (1998), Swank (2005; 2010), and others have pointed out, there is little reason to suspect that the importance of the “compensation” function of the welfare state has diminished in advanced postindustrial capitalism.

9 Rodrik’s justification for this conclusion is that Western Europe has experienced a relatively large immigration shock while Latin American has faced a relatively large economic shock (and, in turn, witnessed a rise in Left populist movements that seek to mobilize voters around an economic class cleavage).

10 We draw on the excellent analysis of the nature and foundations of solidarity in diverse societies by contributors to Bannting and Kymlicka (2017). Specifically, we use the concept of social solidarity to mean broadly inclusive, redistributive solidarity, or the presence of widely accepted norms and practices that foster social and economic inclusion of socially diverse groups.
Some welfare states, however, may be more successful than others in promoting socioeconomic and political stability. At comparable levels of taxation, universalistic welfare states — systems characterized by comprehensive and equal coverage of citizens within risk categories, a generous social wage, and well developed active labor market programs to reintegrate workers into the labor market — will do a better job than corporatist conservative (and liberal) welfare states in weakening the linkage between new insecurities and risks on the one hand, and electoral support for RRWP parties on the other.\(^1\) That is, where the welfare state comprehensively protects workers at relatively high (and equal) levels of income replacement and provides substantial subsidies for public or private sector jobs, training, and labor market services, the underlying sense of economic insecurity and decline is somewhat weakened. In turn, the impetus to vote for parties that articulate radical reform of the political economy, populism, and nativism should be diminished for some voters that would otherwise support the radical populist right. However, the typical corporatist conservative welfare state provides very generous income replacement primarily to workers with long-established employment records and privileged socioeconomic status, a low social minimum level of support for workers with weak or intermittent employment records (e.g., young, lower skilled workers) and relatively modest levels of active labor market policy.\(^2\) Indeed, as analysts have argued, one of the largest threats to the efficacy and legitimacy the corporatist conservative welfare state is the expansion

\(^1\) In Esping-Andersen’s (1990) original formulation of “three worlds” of welfare capitalism, universalism refers to comprehensive coverage of populations with high benefit equality. In later work, researchers illustrated that this feature of welfare states is highly correlated with substantial income replacement and public social services such as active labor market programs (e.g., Huber and Stephens 2001; Swank 2002, Ch. 4); we adopt this broader definition of universalism here. Corporatist conservative welfare states are characterized by generous, but occupationally stratified social protection, social insurance funding, and relatively low levels of social service provision and active labor market policies. Liberal welfare states are characterized by disproportionate reliance on means-testing and private insurance as well as moderate to low levels of income replacement and social service provision. Generally, well developed universal and corporatist conservative welfare states have similar tax burdens (Swank 2002). For a critical assessment of the empirical basis of the regime framework, see among others, Scruggs and Allan (2008).

\(^2\) For instance, the commitment of national resources to active labor market programs in the universal welfare states is close to twice as much as in the corporatist conservative welfare states (for instance, 1.2 versus .7 percent of GDP, respectively, during the 2010s).
of labor market dualism and general “social exclusion” of increasing numbers of citizens (e.g., Thelen 2014).

In addition, Bo Rothstein’s (1998) seminal analysis suggests that the political and moral logic of universal welfare state will promote high levels of mass support for welfare state and national institutions (also see Rothstein 2017). The political logic of the universal welfare state weds the self-interest of the poor, working class, and middle class through relatively generous and universal social insurance and services. As to the moral logic, values of equal respect and concern embodied in program structure, broadly targeted universal benefits, carefully adapted delivery organizations, and participatory administrative processes achieve relatively high levels of contingent consent from the citizenry. Solidarity, trust, and confidence in state intervention are promoted. Everything else being equal, this support may well lesson the resonance for some voters of anti-statist and anti-establishment RRWP party electoral appeals. While a similar “moral logic” can be applied to the corporatist conservative welfare states (e.g., given the prevalence of the principle of solidarity), the occupational fragmentation of the system and the potential for social exclusion arguably make it more vulnerable to attacks and less capable of addressing new risks and insecurities. For welfare states characterized by the more liberal attributes of disproportionate reliance on means-tested programs and private insurance (e.g., Thatcher’s Britain), the political and moral logics that support the welfare state are weaker.

The empirical literature, furthermore, has provided some support for elements of the logic of the universalistic welfare state. For instance, Anderson and Pontusson (2001) find that

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13 Substantial adaptation to post-industrial pressures notwithstanding, the universal welfare states of Northern Europe have retained much of their basic character during the late 20th and early 21st centuries (see, among others, Hemerijck’s [2013] wide-ranging analysis of change and continuity in welfare state regimes and survey of the literature on welfare state transformation). Generally, they have also sustained ample amounts of public support (e.g., Svallfors 2012).

14 In liberal welfare states, problems related to substantive justice, procedural justice, and a fair distribution of burdens are endemic. A climate of distrust, conflict, and competition among beneficiaries and among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is promoted by liberal program structure.
individual job insecurity is moderately diminished by the magnitude of social welfare spending; Mayda, O’Rourke, and Sinnott (2007) offer evidence that the link between risk aversion and support for economic protectionism is mitigated by government spending, and Hays (2009, Ch.2) shows that the social wage and ALMP spending lesson hostility to free trade. In addition, on the basis of new analysis of European Social Survey data, Reeskens and Oorshot (2017) find that individual tolerance for immigrants is enhanced by citizens’ assessments of the quality of social rights and by aggregate social welfare effort. Moreover, our earlier work on this topic showed that effects of trade, capital, and immigration openness on electoral support for RRWP parties, themselves, were lessoned in 1981-to-1998 west European elections by the presence of a universalistic welfare state (Swank and Betz. 2003); similarly, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2016) find that the link between unemployment and far right parties votes in recent European Parliament elections is weakened by the generosity of the social wage.

Overall, at similar levels of taxation and political economic structure, we expect universal welfare states to be associated with less support for the new far right; we also expect universalism to weaken the positive impact of globalization on the electoral success of RRWP parties. To be completely clear, we are not arguing that polities with universal welfare states will have no (or even small) RRWP parties. Our argument is that net of other forces (which may produce electorally consequential RRWP parties in relatively universalistic welfare states such as Denmark and Norway, and more recently Finland and Sweden), a social policy configuration of comprehensive coverage and benefit equality, a generous social wage, and well-developed active labor market policy will tend to directly depress the vote for RRWP parties and weaken the linkage between internationalization and RRWP party support.15

15 In an NYT article focused on worker’s anxiety in the face of automation, a story with strong implications for understanding economic insecurity in the face of advanced post-industrial change generally, Peter Goodman (2017)
Labor Market Institutions. Complimentary to universalistic welfare state structures, three features of labor markets should be important to the moderation of support for RRWP parties. First, employment protection laws (hereafter EPL) are commonly view as a complement in the promotion of general economic security to the egalitarian income supports of the universalistic welfare state, especially in social market economies of central and northern western Europe (e.g., Pontusson 2005). In fact, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2016) have recently argued that the costs of unemployment to its victims and the heightened perceptions of job insecurity associated with unemployment for those still working will be lessoned by EPL. The consequences for the success of RRWP parties should be clear. In their study of voting in European Parliamentary elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014 in 28 EU member states, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2016) find that at relatively lower levels of EPL, unemployment has significant, positive impacts of the RRWP party vote; this effect disappears at relatively higher levels of EPL. Overall, this argument resonates with our stress on solidartistic institutions and we assess direct and mediating roles of EPL with respect to the RRWP party vote, below.

In addition, union organization, conceptualized here as union density and the centralization of political economic power in one or few national peak associations, should play a substantial role in the mitigation of the impact of globalization on RRWP party electoral success. We offer this hypothesis for a number of reasons. First, labor organization has large, significant effects on electoral mobilization (Radcliff and Davis 2000) and, in turn, on votes for
left parties (Arndt and Rennwald 2016) in contemporary democracies. As such, political economies with continuing relatively strong union movements may bolster support for mainstream social democracy (or left populism) in the face or potential defections of workers to RRWP parties (see below for more on this point). Also, union organization also compresses wage differentials (e.g., Rueda 2008), and, in turn, may significantly contribute to the mitigation of economic insecurities and declines in socioeconomic status for workers who might otherwise vote for RRWP parties.

With respect to union density, high levels of union membership should bolster citizen support for fairness, social justice, and socioeconomic equality. As Iversen and Soskice (2015) have noted, unions disseminate political information and provide forums for political discussion. This, in turn, fosters a better understanding of material interests by members and the capacity of members to make informed political choices. Mosimann and Pontusson (2017), moreover, note that unions’ behavior and rhetoric create distributive norms (fairness, aversion to inequalities) that members adopt as their own.\(^\text{17}\) In fact, in a new study of how unionization shapes who has “left the (mainstream) left” and where these formerly left voters have gone, Rennwald and Pontusson (2017) show that union membership decreases the probability that union leavers will vote for the radical right (and increases the chances they will support the radical left).

Union centralization, moreover, reinforces the normative orientations of densely organized union movements. Centralized peak associations are more likely to promote coherence in norms and policy positions across the union movement. In addition, as Hall (2017) has

\(^\text{17}\) High levels of overall union density should also effectively incorporate many outsiders, potentially including foreign members of the labor force, into the labor movement. Indeed, scholars have stressed that where unions remain relatively encompassing (Nordic countries and Belgium), low-wage service sector unions, for instance, are represented alongside core sector industrial unions and white-collar workers (e.g., Huo 2009; Beecher and Pontusson 2011).
recently argued, the general disposition of centralized union peak associations has been to champion broad social justice goals as they seek to promote solidaristic wage bargaining and egalitarian social policy; unions organized on sectoral and skill basis tend not to do this as they focus on wage bargaining within individual sectors and crafts. For these reasons, we expect that encompassing and centralized union organization will generally suppress the RRWP party vote and moderate the impact of trade, capital mobility, and flows of asylum seekers and refugees on RRWP electoral success.

Finally, one might hypothesize that net of densely organized and centralized trade union associations, *corporatist institutions* -- sustained patterns of cooperative interactions among labor, capital, and the state -- moderate electoral support for RRWP parties. This may be so because corporatist arrangements tend to promote inclusive representation of labor’s economic interests within the state and within collective bargaining arenas; foster consensus-building across labor, employer and state actors; and potentially generate trust, reciprocity, and a concern for the public interest and positive sum outcomes among corporatist actors (e.g., Lijphart 2012; Swank and Martin 2001). As academic analysis has shown, corporatist institutions continue to foster more egalitarian adaptation to post-industrial pressure through, among other mechanisms, the supportive preferences and participation of employers’ associations in pro-labor policies and practices (e.g., Martin and Swank 2012). Similarly, both journalistic observers (Goodman 2017) and academic analysis (e.g., Hays, 2009) have observed the mitigation of economic anxiety through relatively effective adaptation to globalization and technological change in corporatist contexts where cooperation and trust among labor and employers is deeply ingrained. Generally, where corporatist institutions remain relatively strong, therefore, workers’ economic insecurities in the face of post-industrial pressures might be lessened, and the probability that workers (and
other citizens) move toward extremism of the right (or left) may be diminished. On the other hand, corporatist institutions may increasingly fail to produce good outcomes for workers and others in the postindustrial economy (e.g., through loss of capacity under advanced post-industrialization or in the context of liberalizing reforms). In addition, well-developed corporatism may be viewed as an exclusionary and elitist institution by labor market outsiders (e.g., semi- and unskilled workers harmed by globalization), among others; as such, corporatism may be unrelated or even positively associated with electoral success of the RRWP parties, net of other factors.

METHODS AND MODELS

Empirical Models and Measurement

We assess our theoretical expectations about the electoral impacts of globalization and institutions of social solidarity through analysis of RRWP party vote shares in national parliamentary elections in 16 west European nations (see Table 1) between 1981 and 2015. We use national parliamentary elections (lower chambers) because they are relatively consistent in structure and in political importance across nations and time. To test our hypotheses about internationalization and its mediation by solidaristic institutions, we control for a number of factors emphasized in the theoretical, country study, and quantitative literatures on the rise of the right-wing populism.

Our general model of RRWP vote shares specifies that electoral success will be directly

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18 For an insightful analysis of changes in the structure and efficacy of corporatism in advanced capitalism, see Baccaro (2014).
19 We exclude Iceland and Luxembourg as well as the post-communist systems of Eastern Europe for a variety of theoretical and methodological reasons. We exclude the non-European Anglo democracies to limit the proportion of zero values for RRWP party vote share and to maintain the homogeneity of the sample. We begin the analysis in the early 1980s because, with the exception of the Danish and Norwegian cases, RRWP parties had not won more than trivial shares of the vote before that time. In addition, an extension of the study back in time to the 1970s would have been problematic because of the absence of competitive elections in Greece, Portugal, and Spain before the 1974-1977 period and because of data unavailability on some key indicators. We end the analyses in 2015 also because of data unavailability for a number of explanatory variables.
influenced by a set of domestic economic and political forces. As to economics, scholars have emphasized the role of technologically driven deindustrialization, or the shift in medium and low skilled employment from relatively high paying industrial sector jobs to irregular and lower paying service sector employment, in fostering economic insecurities and inequalities ((Harrison and Bluestone 1988; and on the causal roles of technology versus globalization, see the review of Kiersenkowski and Koske 2012). Net of other factors, job loss, uncertainty, and decline in social status for those in traditional industries and occupations that tend to accompany deindustrialization may contribute to RRWP party success. In addition, scholars have stressed the causal role of the secular post-1960s deterioration of macroeconomic performance in RRWP party success. In fact, business cycles and, especially, unemployment rates have been highlighted in the quantitative analyses of the correlates of RRWP party success, and we control for macroeconomic performance here (for a recent review of the mixed evidence on the role of the unemployment rate see Amengay and Stockemer 2018).

As to domestic political forces, we account for the electoral effects of proportional representation (PR). This control is not only important because PR and related electoral system factors may facilitate the electoral system entry of RRWP parties, PR and associated features of consensus democracy may produce some convergence in economic and social policy across parties and, in turn, electoral openings for RRWP parties who challenge the status quo. In addition, as Inglehart (1990) and others have argued, the neoliberal, traditional conservative, and

20 It is important to note that we cannot examine some supply-side hypotheses such as the internal strategic behavior of mainstream and radical populist party leaders and related dynamics emphasized by scholars like Art (2011) and Kitschelt (1995), among others, nor can we systematically account for a variety of country-specific factors in models such as those developed here. Although analysis of aggregate data across all of Western Europe during the 1980 to 2015 period offers a powerful tool for assessing structural theories (especially when specified causal mechanisms are supported by individual-level evidence), we recognize the limits of this approach. We will expand the diversity of methods (e.g, individual level survey data, case studies) in our subsequent work.

21 We thank Herbert Kitschelt for bringing this possibility to our attention. In addition, might note that scholars have tested the impact of a number of other features of electoral and party systems on RRWP party success, and most have proven to be unrelated to electoral outcomes (for a review, see Amengay and Stockemer 2018).
xenophobic electoral appeals of RRWP parties may be evidence of a materialist reaction to
dispersion of the values of environmental quality, civil and political rights, and multiculturalism
and their promotion by new left parties within the most affluent nations. For a contemporary
statement of this argument, see Inglehart and Norris (2016). We account, below, for the prospect
that increases in new left party success will be related to subsequent rises in RRWP party vote
shares.

Party system dynamics and strategic adaptations of extant parties, particularly those of
the Right, may contribute significantly to our understanding of RRWP party success. For
instance, in his seminal study, Kitschelt (1995) has argued that established parties of the right, to
the extent they have embraced centrist, consensus-oriented policies, have typically allowed
RRWP parties to capture the terrain of neoliberal reform. Where parties of the right have
embraced some RRWP party positions, the electoral success of the new far right has been
circumscribed. While we can not hope to model the richness of party system dynamics in
empirical models such as those developed here, we do suspect that where established right
parties have enjoyed high levels of electoral success in the recent past, RRWP parties may find
the task of garnering votes more difficult than where established parties of the Right are
historically weak or in decline. Finally, the experiences of the early Scandinavian Progress
parties and the ostensible neoliberal programs of most contemporary RRWP parties suggest that
the character of the state — especially its tax burdens — may directly influence the level of
potential support for RRWP parties. In fact, Harold Wilensky (1976) offered one of the earliest
tests of a theory of RRWP support by examining the relationship between taxation and the ascent
of the Scandinavian Progress parties. Given that nearly all RRWP parties continue to embrace
tax reduction as a central part of their program, we expect the magnitude of taxation will be
associated with party success.

On the basis of our theoretical framework and considerations discussed above, we offer the following empirical model of RRWP party vote (RRWP). Equation 1:

\[
RRWP_e = \alpha + \beta_0(RRWP_{e-1}) + \beta_1(CAPMOB) + \beta_2(IMPORTS LDC) + \beta_3(FOREIGN) \\
+ \beta_4(WELSTATE) - \beta_5(DEIND) - \beta_6(GROWTH) + \beta_7(LEFTLIB) - \beta_8(RIGHT) \\
+ \beta_9(PROREP) + \beta_{10}(TAXATION) + \varepsilon,
\]

where \(e\) denotes a national election year, \(\alpha\) is the equation intercept, \(RRWP_{e-1}\) through \(TAXATION\) are central explanatory variables as defined below, \(\beta_0\) through \(\beta_{10}\) are parameters relating \(RRWP\) to \(RRWP_{e-1}\) through \(TAXATION\), and \(\varepsilon\) is an error term. We initially include the vote share of \(RRWP\) parties at the previous election \((RRWP_{e-1})\) as a corrective for serially correlated errors and, as Beck and Katz (1996) have suggested, as a means to make explicit model dynamics; lagged vote share also allows us to assess the (in)stability in RRWP party support.

We operationalize globalization in terms of average merchandise imports (imports of goods as percentage shares of GDP) from (non-oil-exporting) less developed nations over the \(t-1\) to \(t-3\) period \((IMPORTS LDC)\), a summary measure of capital openness (i.e., an index of the absence of national restrictions on capital movements at \(t-1\)) \((CAPMOB)\), and the inflows of asylum seekers and refugees as a percentage of the population averaged over the last three years \((FOREIGN)\). We use multiple year averages for imports of goods and asylum seekers-refugees because of annual volatility in these phenomena. In supplemental analyses, we substitute alternatives for these measures and test for the electoral consequences of them (total imports and exports of merchandise from developing economies, total trade in goods and services, flows of specific types of capital, and total foreign immigration). Finally, although these measures of internationalization will capture many of the effects of European economic integration, we also
test for independent political effects of the deepening of the European Union (e.g., the advent of the Eurozone). We discuss these supplemental tests below and report full results in an online Appendix (see the included Appendix, below, for the data sources and further information on our variables).

With respect to institutions of social solidarity, we first test for the direct effects of a general measure of the universal welfare state: a cross-nationally and temporally varying version of Esping-Andersen’s index of population coverage and benefit equality in unemployment, sickness and pension benefits; the generosity of the social wage (average net unemployment compensation rates for single worker and standard families), and national resources devoted to active labor market policies as a percentage of GDP (WELSTATE). For employment security, we use the OECD’s widely used measure of employment protection provisions (e.g., notification, hearing, appeal and severance pay requirements for termination from regular employment) (EMPSECURITY). Union organization is measured by an index of union density and centralization of power in national peal associations (UNIONORG) and corporatism is measured by an index of tripartite concertation and policy-making, integration of union and employer’s organizations within the state, and coordination of wage bargaining (CORPORATISM).

After assessing direct linear effects, we examine the role of social protection as well as other dimensions of solidaristic institutions discussed above in mediating the electoral impacts of trade, capital, and immigration openness. We do so by adding interactions between international variables on the one hand, and WELSTATE, EMPSECURITY, UNIONORG, and CORPORATISM to our models. Subsequently, we drive precise estimates of the electoral impact of typical changes in dimensions of internationalization for the sample in specific institutional contexts (e.g., low and high welfare state protection and low and high levels of employment security as
well as low and high levels of union organization and corporatism).

As to our general model, we follow Iversen and Cusack (2000) and measure deindustrialization as 100 minus industrial and agricultural employment as a percentage share of the working age population (DEIND). (We also examine an alternative measure, namely, the percentage of total employment accounted for by work in manufacturing). In addition, we include a basic measure of (lagged) economic growth (GROWTH) to assess the common proposition that post-1973 deterioration of macroeconomic performance is an important source of electoral support for the new far right. Growth is measured as the percentage change in real per capita GDP in international dollars. (We also estimated the electoral effects of general unemployment and long-term unemployment and report the results below.) We use a simple one-year lag for growth and unemployment if the national election is in the early months of the year; we use a mean growth (unemployment) rate for the election year and the immediately prior year if the contest for parliament falls in the later months of the election year. (We use annual data because our measures of growth and -term unemployment are not available on a quarterly or monthly basis for our entire sample).

As to domestic political factors, we use an ordinal indicator of the degree of proportionality in electoral rules to measure the character of the electoral system (PROREP). In the absence of data on the prevalence of post-materialist values for a significant portion of our national election years, we use the vote share of “new left,” or left-libertarian parties at the previous election as a proxy for attendant cultural conflict (LEFTLIB). A measure of the electoral strength (average vote share in elections over the preceding 10 years) of established right parties (RIGHT) is used as the primary indicator of the focal party system factor discussed
above. In addition, given the aforementioned tax backlash literature, we incorporate a measure of total taxation as a share of GDP (TAXATION) in the general model.

**Estimation.** Our dependent variable, RRWP party vote, is a limited dependent variable in that it is "censored" in roughly a third of our cases (i.e., it takes on the value of 0.00, a lower limit, in 49 out of 152 of our national elections). In such cases, Ordinary Least Squares estimation of a linear model would violate several assumptions of the method (e.g., a zero mean for the OLS errors) and would produce biased and inconsistent estimates of $\beta_0$ through $\beta_{10}$ in Equation 1 above. An attractive alternative to OLS is Tobin's Maximum Likelihood procedure. The "Tobit" model extends the familiar probit procedure for estimating a non-linear probability model of a dichotomous variable to the case of a censored dependent variable and produces consistent and unbiased estimates of $\beta_0$ through $\beta_{10}$ in Equation 1.\(^2^4\)

We also should note that our analysis "pools" eight to eleven election years for each of 16 nations. While serial correlation will be minimal (in the presence of the lagged dependent variable) and while the Tobit procedure will produce consistent estimates in panel models, estimates will be inefficient in the presence of unit effects (Greene 2000). The principal available estimator to accommodate the pooled structure of the data is a Tobit random effects estimator.\(^2^5\) Likelihood ratio tests showed the standard pooled and random effects models in our analysis do not differ so we report the basic pooled Tobit model estimates below. Finally, to assess

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\(^2^2\) Given the rising importance of semi and unskilled blue-collar voters to RRWP parties, we alternatively assess whether long-term trends in the strength of mainstream left parties shapes the fortunes of the new far right.

\(^2^3\) See Kmenta (1986, Section 11-6), on problems of OLS in such cases and the Tobit alternative.

\(^2^4\) Given that Y (RRWP) is hypothesized to be a function of the X (RRWP through TAXATION in Equation 1), the Tobit model estimates the likelihood function as a composite of the cumulative distribution function (when $Y_i = 0.0$) and the density function (when $Y_i > 0.0$) of a standard normal variable, as given by Kmenta (1986), Equation 11.133. In effect, normalized Tobit coefficients such as those reported below embody two sets of information. First, they represent the effect of a causal variable on the probability that the dependent variable takes on a non-zero value; second, they express the relationship between an independent variable and the dependent variable when the latter varies across non-zero values. See Greene (2000) and the literature cited therein.

\(^2^5\) For a discussion of issues involved with “fixed effects” Tobit models and an effort to address them, see Honoré (1992).
robustness, we re-estimated our core equations with variations in sample composition; these alternative models are presented in the online Appendix.

**FINDINGS**

The results of our estimation of the basic model of 1981-to-2015 national parliamentary vote shares of RRWP parties, including the direct electoral effects of solidaristic institutions, are reported in Table 2. Given Tobit coefficients are not easily interpretable (see note 24), we transform the Tobit coefficients to standard regression coefficients for statistically significant variables and report these in Table 2.A, below. With respect to globalization, the electoral effects of imports from developing nations and capital mobility are positive and significant at the .10 level. In some versions of the basic model, the trade factor slips just below conventional levels of significance. Substitutions of alternative measures of trade and capital mobility such as aggregate trade in goods and services or total capital flows produced similar or weaker results. On the other hand, the impact of the immigration factor on the electoral fortunes of RRWP parties is highly significant and robust across all models in our analysis.\(^{26}\) Finally, tests for an electoral effect of the development of the European Union, itself, suggests the absence of an independent EU effect. For instance, dichotomous variables tapping ascent to EU membership, Eurozone membership, or similar institutional developments all have insignificant impacts on support for the radical populist right, net of the impact of factors in the basic model.

One important addendum to these findings is that in the alternative specification of the basic model where manufacturing employment (as a share of all employment) is substituted for general deindustrialization, the trade and capital mobility factors consistently fall to just below statistical significance. That is, decline in core manufacturing sector jobs appears to channel, at

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\(^{26}\) Alternative measures of immigration such as total inflows of immigrants follow the same pattern, although their substantive impact is far smaller than that of refuges and asylum seekers.
least in part, the electoral effects of rising trade and capital openness. In a model of manufacturing employment, increases in trade and capital mobility are significantly associated with declines in manufacturing jobs. In turn, the share of workers in manufacturing, itself, is negatively and significantly related to the vote share of RRWP parties ($b = -.1717$, $se = .1076$). Inclusion of the manufacturing variable does not alter the estimated electoral impact of inflows of asylum seekers and refugees.

-Table 2 about here-

The direct impacts of solidaristic institutions on the vote shares of the RRWP parties are reported in the subsequent four rows of Table 2. Universalistic social protection registers a negative and statistically significant electoral impact, as predicted; that is, solidaristic social policy, as conceptualized and measured here, consistently suppresses the vote of RRWP parties, net of other factors. The effect is robust in all specifications of our model. On the other hand, there are no direct effects on RRWP vote shares of other solidaristic institutions: coefficients for employment protection, union organization, and corporatism are all insignificant. In addition, the coefficients for unions and corporatist institutions are incorrectly signed. (We will wait until we examine whether or not these institutions mediate effects of globalization factors before drawing any conclusions on their roles.)

With respect to the general model, economic growth rates (or the unemployment rate substitutes), the intermediate-term strength of the mainstream right, proportional representation, and the measure of deindustrialization are consistently insignificant. On the other hand, the vote

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27 These findings come from a model that regresses the share of employment in manufacturing on our lagged trade and capital mobility variables with controls for full country and year effects.

28 Multicollinearity-induced inflation of standard errors is not a likely cause of insignificance in case of employment protection laws (where standard error inflation, as estimated in an OLS assessment of multicollinearity, is trivial). On the other hand, standard errors of union and corporatist variables may be inflated by as much as 50 percent. That said, regression of RRWP party votes on these variables in models where collinear variables are removed produced the same results.
share of the left libertarian parties in the previous election, levels of tax burdens, and, of course, the vote share of RRWP parties in the last election are all significantly (and positively) correlated with current RRWP electoral success. Again, the decline of manufacturing employment (when substituted for deindustrialization is associated with increased support for the RRWP parties. But, core measures of business cycles – or short-term macroeconomic performance -- is not. Finally, we should mention that given the notable movement of working class voters to RRWP parties, we also substituted in the model an intermediate to long-term measure of the electoral strength of mainstream left parties (in place of mainstream right support); this factor is consistently insignificant, net of other factors.

-Table 2.A- about here-

We now turn to the important question of how important substantively the effects of the statistically significant factors are; we report the Tobit results that have been converted to standard regression coefficients in Table 2.A.\textsuperscript{29} We report the regression coefficient that represents the change in RRWP party vote share that occurs with a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. As the table suggests, capital mobility and trade have modest impacts on the vote; an increase of one standard deviation unit of capital mobility and imports from developing countries increases the vote share of the radical populist right by roughly three and two percentage points, respectively. In addition, the electoral impact of inflows of refugees and asylum seekers is large; inflows equivalent to a one standard deviation unit increases the RRWP party vote share by over four percent.

The direct impact of a universalistic welfare state is important. Net of the impact of other factors, an increase of one standard deviation unit in our index of universal coverage and benefit

\textsuperscript{29} Recall that to convert Tobit coefficients to regression coefficients, one divides the Tobit estimate by the standard error of the model and multiplies by the relevant unit of measurement of the explanatory variable.
equality, social wage generosity, and active labor market policy lowers the RRWP vote by about four and a half percent. With regard to the other significant effects from the basic model, the substantive impact of recent electoral support for left libertarian parties is important (and significant); a one standard deviation unit increase in recent support for new left parties is associated with a near five percent increase in current RRWP party vote. Similarly, tax burdens are positively and significantly related to electoral support for the radical populist right; a one standard deviation unit increase in tax burdens increases the RRWP party vote share by roughly three percent. Past support for RRWP parties, itself, is also important; an increase of one standard deviation in the RRWP vote in the last election (7.28 percent), results in over six percent greater RRWP party vote share in the current election, net of other factors that contribute to the RRWP party vote.

-Table 3 about here-

We now turn to the question of whether the electoral impacts of globalization factors are conditioned by the domestic institutional context.; specifically, do solidaristic institutions weaken the large positive effect of, let us say, inflows of refugees and asylum seekers on voters’ tendencies to turn to the radical populist right? To assess the institutional mediation of globalization’s impacts, we estimated interaction terms between the three dimensions of globalization emphasized in our analysis on the one hand, and three of the four solidaristic institutions. (We drop the consideration of corporatism because its direct and mediating role is never statistically significant.) We report the results of the nine interaction tests in Appendix

30 Estimation of the individual effects of the three components of the index reveals all three variables are negatively related to votes (where generosity and universalism, alone, fall just short of significance and active labor market policy is significant).
31 Recall that the effect of some variable $X_1$ (globalization factor) on $Y$ at variable levels of $X_2$ (institutional context) is given by $\beta_1 + \beta_3[X_2]$, where $\beta_3$ is the coefficient for the interaction of $X_1$ and $X_2$. Standard errors for these marginal effects are readily computed (Kam and Franzese 2009). And, as Kam and Franzese and other students of interactions suggest, one should examine the individual marginal effects at meaningful levels of the mediating variable even if the interaction term, itself, is insignificant.
Table 1, below. In Table 3, we report the marginal effects of globalization factors on RRWP party vote at low and high levels of each solidaristic institution. We have also converted the Tobit coefficients to standard regression coefficients to facilitate interpretation. We highlight in bold italics each cell where the impact of a globalization factor on RRWP party vote share notably differs across the relevant institutional context. We also display graphicly in Figure 1 an illustrative case of the mediation of globalization by a solidaristic institutional context; we use the mediation of the substantively large and significant electoral impact of inflows of refuges and asylum seekers by union organization.

-Figure 1 about here-

With regard to capital mobility, the interactions between it and universalistic welfare state and employment security are not significant, and the marginal effects reveal no meaningful differences; the analysis suggests the substantively modest electoral impact of capital mobility (an additional 2.78 percent of the vote for a standard deviation unit increase in capital mobility) is constant across levels of social protection and employment protection. An examination of marginal effects of capital mobility across levels of union organization, however, reveals that capital mobility is only significant at relatively lower levels of union organization; at high levels of union organization; the impact of capital mobility on RRWP party vote shares is effectively trivial. The modest electoral impacts of imports from developing economies are also relatively similar across institutional contexts. The interactions between imports and the three institutional contexts are insignificant and there are no signs that marginal impacts of imports across levels of institutional context are significant in some contexts and not in others. Generally speaking, a

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32 Given that the direct effects reported in the basic model of the first column of Table 2 are virtually universally replicated in the presence of interaction terms, we don’t report full equation results (e.g., nine near identical sets of estimates for the full model. Full results are given in the online appendix).
33 We should note that when one estimates interactions it is important to examine the marginal impacts of a causal
one standard deviation unit increase in merchandise imports from (non-oil exporting) developing nations is associated with a rise of just under two percent of the vote share of radical populist right.

As suggested by theory and confirmed in Table 2, the vote share of RRWP parties is relatively responsive to inflows of asylum seekers and refugees; as noted, a one standard deviation unit increase in inflows is associated with a rise of just over four percent of the vote for the radical populist right. Is the electoral impact of this important factor conditioned by solidartistic institutional context? As results in the third column if Table 3 illustrate, the positive impact of inflows of asylum seekers and refugees is highly contingent on institutional context. For instance, in the context of relatively low levels of universalistic social protection (e.g., Austria and Spain in the 1990s), the impact of inflows equivalent to one standard deviation unit is significant and large (over five percent of the vote); the impact of asylum seekers and refugees falls below conventional significance in clearly universal welfare states and is substantively much smaller (just under three percent of the vote). This pattern largely repeats itself for the impact of inflows of asylum seekers and refugees across levels of employment security and union organization.

It is important to highlight the importance of densely organized and centralized unions, as we do in Table 3 and Figure 1. At very low levels of union organization (-2.0 on the union standard score index, a value not reached in our sample of national election years), the electoral impact of a standard deviation unit increase in inflows of asylum seekers and refugees would approach 10 percent, net of other factors (see Figure 1). As union organization increases to average levels (0.0 on the standard score index), a level characteristic of the Netherlands in

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factor across values of a mediating factor even if the interaction term, itself., is insignificant (Kam and Franzese 2009). We did this systematically for correctly signed interactions that approach significance.
recent decades, the impact of a one standard deviation unit increase in inflows on the RRWP party vote is roughly five percent of the vote. At moderately high levels of union organization (say -1.5 on the index as in the Nordic countries in earlier decades), the electoral impact of asylum seekers and refugees is largely trivial and insignificant.

CONCLUSIONS

The theoretical argument that globalization and broader features of postindustrial transformation of European societies play a role in the success of the radical populist right certainly receives some support in our analysis. The role of immigration, most notably the inflows of refugees and asylum seekers, seems especially important. So too does the presence of a social policy regime that provides universal coverage and relatively equal and generous benefits and commitments of national resources to training and labor market services for those strata affected by postindustrial pressures. Moreover, the universalistic welfare state as well as employment security policies and encompassing and centralized union organization, all institutions that promote economic security, principles of fairness and social justice, and generally militate against anxiety and hostility to outsider groups, each moderate the electoral impact of globalization. This is especially true when it comes to moderating the large effect that inflows of asylum seekers and refugees have on the electoral success of RRWP parties. Generally, this pattern findings – modest impacts of economic globalization and large impacts of immigration moderated by solidaristic institutions – is consistent with the point that a central feature of the underlying dynamics of RRWP success is the mobilization of “losers” in postindustrial society by exploitation of the largely cultural cleavage between natives and outsiders.
In addition, our analysis also indicates that RRWP vote shares are shaped by two important features of domestic politics in advanced postindustrial society. First, and not unrelated to the perceived cultural conflict between natives and foreigners, past levels of support of left libertarian parties is important. As an indicator of the spread and electoral relevance of postmodern values in European societies, the significant electoral impact of recent new left party support on the RRWP party vote offers some support for the basic idea that the success of RRWP parties is influenced, at least to a degree, by the cultural conflicts among postmodernists and traditionalists (e.g., Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Norris, 2017). Second, as we have noted, while the general level of support for domestic neoliberalism seems to have declined among the radical populist right since the 1980s (see Appendix Figure 1), these parties still near universally stress tax reductions as a central part of their program. Our finding that tax burdens, net of other factors, are a significant correlate of RRWP party vote share highlights the continued relevance of a linkage between taxes and anti-statist sentiment on the one hand, and support for the radical populist right on the other.

Finally, we might note that our findings have implications for the future of solidaristic institutions and, in turn, the role of RRWP parties in European politics. Specifically, while research on the question is just beginning, there is some indication that RRWP parties may have an impact on the structure of European social policies. For instance, the general emphasis on welfare chauvinism, or the stress on the perceived need to protect social benefits and services by restricting access to them by foreigners, seems to have produced some highly visible retrenchments of immigrant benefits in some European countries, including universalistic Denmark and Sweden. Moreover, as Gordon’s (2018) analysis of the rollback of general unemployment compensation in Sweden in recent years shows, social programs that are linked to
heavy use by immigrants have become politically vulnerable. To the extent rollbacks of generosity and increases in benefit inequality and program stratification proceed, political support for the universal welfare state will decline. In turn, institutional impediments to RRWP party electoral power are weakened.

Overall, we might conclude by noting that in some ways, the electoral impact of globalization is subtler, and potentially much stronger, than indicated by the results of our analysis. This is so because increases in trade and capital openness have had direct consequences for the power and organization of union movements and have bolstered fiscal constraints on the welfare state. International economic liberalization has also reinforced domestic economic liberalization, including labor market deregulation. To the extent that these changes produce efficiency, employment, and broadly shared economic gains, the impact on political instability, including the rise of the radical populist right, is likely to be minimal or non-existent. However, in the absence of these outcomes, the globalization-induced weakening of solidaristic institutions in effect significantly contributes to political instability.
Appendix - Data Sources and Notes

Right-Wing Populist Parties

Right-Wing Populist Party vote:


Right-Wing Populist Parties, classification (for sources see Swank *Comparative Political Parties Dataset*):

- Austria: Freedom Party, Alliance for the Future of Austria, Team Frank Stronach
- Belgium: Vlaams Block/Flemish Interest; National Front, List De Decker, People’s Party
- Denmark: Progress Party/People’s Party
- Finland: True Finns
- France: National Front
- Germany: Republicans, Alternative for Germany
- Greece: Popular Orthodox Rally, Independent Hellenes
- Ireland: none
- Italy: Lega Nord (The League)
- Netherlands: List Pim Fortuyn, Freedom Party/Group Wilders
- Norway: Progress Party
- Portugal: National Renovator Party
- Spain: National Democracy
- Sweden: New Democracy, Sweden Democrats
- Switzerland: Automobile/Swiss Motorist Party, League of Tessins, Swiss People’s Party (1995 and after), League of the People of Ticino
- United Kingdom: British National Party, UK Independence Party

Left Libertarian Party Vote


Social Policies

*ALMP*: Active labor market policy spending as a percentage of GDP. Source: OECD iLibrary (Social Expenditures Data Base).


Employment Protection Laws:


Union Organization:

Standard score index of union density, 0.0 to 4.0 scale of centralization of powers in the largest national peak association (control of affiliate appointments, control over strikes, collective bargaining strategy, conflict funds), and 0.0 to 1.0 scale of integration of unions into public policymaking forums. Source: All variables are from Visser (2013).

Tax Revenues:

Total tax revenues as a percent of GDP. Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics of OECD Countries, OECD iLibrary.

Globalization, Post-industrialization, Business Cycles:

International Capital Mobility: Index of the liberalization of financial and capital controls developed by Quinn (1997) where liberalization is a 0.0 to 100.0 mean scale of the removal of capital controls and restrictions on current account transactions. Source: data from Dennis Quinn, Graduate School of Business, Georgetown University.


FDI and Portfolio Capital Inflows and Outflows: Foreign direct investment outflows as a percentage of GDP (in current US dollars). Source: foreign direct investment: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Trade Statistics; source:

*Deindustrialization, Manufacturing Share of Total Employment:* Deindustrialization: 100 minus industrial and agricultural employment as a percentage share of the working age population. Source: employment and populations variables are from OECD iLibrary, *(Employment and Labor Market Statistics Data Base).*

*Unemployment:* unemployed as a percent of the civilian workforce (standardized scale). Source: OECD iLibrary, *(Employment and Labor Market Statistics Data Base).*

*Per Capita Real GDP* in International Prices; Chain Index (levels or growth rates). Source: Penn World Table Version 9.0. Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer (2015).

**Additional Data Source References**

Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer (2015), "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table" *American Economic Review,* 105(10), 3150-3182, available for download at [www.ggdc.net/pwt](http://www.ggdc.net/pwt)

### Appendix Table 1. The Interaction of Globalization and Institutions of Social Solidarity in the Determination of RRWP Party Electoral Success, 1981-2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediation of Globalization by Universalistic Social Protection</th>
<th>Globalization Factor</th>
<th>Capital Mobility</th>
<th>Imports ( t-1 )</th>
<th>Asylum Seekers and Refugees ( t-1 ) to ( t-3 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Column Globalization Factor ( \times ) Social Protection ( t-1 )</td>
<td>.0801</td>
<td>.1443</td>
<td>-2.4752***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0683)</td>
<td>(.2165)</td>
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<td>Column Globalization Factor</td>
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<td>.0815</td>
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<td>(.1007)</td>
<td>(5.5327)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection ( t-1 )</td>
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<td>-4.2563**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(2.6152)</td>
<td>(1.1822)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediation of Globalization by Employment Security Regulation</th>
<th>Globalization Factor</th>
<th>Employment Protection</th>
<th>Capital Mobility</th>
<th>Imports ( t-1 )</th>
<th>Asylum Seekers and Refugees ( t-1 ) to ( t-3 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Column Globalization Factor ( \times ) Employment Protection ( t-1 )</td>
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<td>.0566</td>
<td>-11.6227**</td>
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<td>(.1311)</td>
<td>(7.1061)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Column Globalization Factor</td>
<td>.0724*</td>
<td>.1366*</td>
<td>12.8359**</td>
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<td>(.0502)</td>
<td>(.1005)</td>
<td>(4.8136)</td>
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<td>Employment Protection ( t-1 )</td>
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<td>-1.3457</td>
<td>-2.5610**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.2014)</td>
<td>(1.9211)</td>
<td>(.8928)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediation of Globalization by Union Organization</th>
<th>Globalization Factor</th>
<th>Employment Protection</th>
<th>Capital Mobility</th>
<th>Imports ( t-1 )</th>
<th>Asylum Seekers and Refugees ( t-1 ) to ( t-3 )</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Column Globalization Factor ( \times ) Union Organization ( t-1 )</td>
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<td>.0619</td>
<td>-8.7437**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.1459)</td>
<td>(5.1905)</td>
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<td>.0810</td>
<td>16.239**</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(.1124)</td>
<td>(5.0871)</td>
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<td>1.6418</td>
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<td>(4.5676)</td>
<td>(.1459)</td>
<td>(1.2510)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table reports coefficients for interactions between globalization factors on the one hand, and institutions of social solidarity on the other. It also reports coefficients for components of interaction terms. (See Note 31 above on interactions.) Interactions were estimated in the equation of the first column of in-text Table 2; estimates for variables in the basic model in these interaction equations remain virtually identical to those reported in Table 2 and, thus, are not reported here.

*significant at the .10 level; ** significant at the .05 level; ***interaction insignificant, but magnitude and significance of marginal effects vary across low and high levels of institutional context; specifically, globalization effect is significant and substantively large at low levels of institutional context and insignificant with smaller or trivial magnitude at high levels of institutional context (see in-text Table 3).
Appendix Figure 1. Support for Welfare Expansion in Party Manifestos: RRWP, Mainstream Right and Mainstream Left Parties, 1980-2015.

Share of party manifestos of respective party types devoted to statements in support of welfare expansion (minus share of statements supporting welfare retrenchment). Source: Party Manifesto Data Collection project as described in in A. Volkens (2013).
Appendix Figure 2. Support for Free Market in Party Manifestos: RRWP, Mainstream Right and Mainstream Left Parties, 1980-2015.

Share of party manifestos of respective party types devoted to statements in support for free markets. Source: Party Manifesto Data Collection project as described in A. Volkens (2013).
REFERENCES


Martin, Cathie Jo and Duane Swank. 2012. The Political Construction of Business Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Inequality, New York: Cambridge University Press


Mosimann, N. and J. Pontusson (2017), Solidaristic unionism and support for redistribution in contemporary Europe,” World Politics published online May 23, 1-45. doi:10.1017/S0043887117000107.


Rothstein, Bo. 2017. “Solidarity, Diversity and the Quality of Government,” pp. 300-326, in
Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, eds., The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies. New York: Oxford University Press.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Principal Parties a</th>
<th>Percentage of National for RWP Parties in Period</th>
<th>Peak Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>Freedom Party (FPÖ)</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Vlaams Block (VB)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Progress Party (FPd), People’s Party (DF)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>True Finns/the Finns (PS)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>National Front (FN)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Alternative for Germany (AfD)</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Independent Greeks (ANEL)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Lega Nord/The League (LN)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Freedom Party/Group Wilders (PVV)</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Progress Party (FPn)</td>
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<td>10.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>National Renovator Party (PNR)</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>National Democracy (DN)</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Swedish Democrats (SD)</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Swiss People’s Party (post-1995), (SVP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK Independence Party (UKIP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average all</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a For references used in party classification, sources of electoral data, and a complete list of parties, see the paper’s Appendix, below.
Table 2. Correlates of Radical Right-Wing Populist Party Success, 1981-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Basic Model</th>
<th>Employment Security</th>
<th>Union Organize</th>
<th>Corporatism</th>
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<td><strong>Globalization and Institutions of Solidarity</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital Mobility (Liberalization) $t$-1</td>
<td>.0697*</td>
<td>.0727*</td>
<td>.0760*</td>
<td>.0701*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.0481)</td>
<td>(.0483)</td>
<td>(.0499)</td>
<td>(.0481)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Merchandise Imports LDC $t$-1</td>
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<td>.1095*</td>
<td>.1104*</td>
<td>.0731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.0887)</td>
<td>(.0885)</td>
<td>(.0887)</td>
<td>(.1065)</td>
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<td>Asylum Seekers and Refugees $t$-1 to $t$-3</td>
<td>13.6617**</td>
<td>12.7812**</td>
<td>13.3412**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.7931)</td>
<td>(4.8729)</td>
<td>(4.8341)</td>
<td>(4.7807)</td>
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<td>Social Protection $t$-1</td>
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<td>(1.0656)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>General Model</strong></td>
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<td>Deindustrialization $t$-1</td>
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<td>(.1316)</td>
<td>(.1303)</td>
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<td>Growth (Percentage Change in Real per capita GDP) $t$-1</td>
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<td>-.0706</td>
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<td>(.1579)</td>
<td>(.1576)</td>
<td>(.1584)</td>
<td>(.1575)</td>
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<td>Left Libertarian Party Vote $t$-1</td>
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<td>.4477**</td>
<td>.4628**</td>
<td>.4627**</td>
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<td>(.1604)</td>
<td>(.1608)</td>
<td>(.1602)</td>
<td>(.1599)</td>
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<td>Mainstream Right Party Vote $t$-1 to $t$-10</td>
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<td>(.0143)</td>
<td>(.0143)</td>
<td>(.0142)</td>
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<td>Proportional Representation $t$-1</td>
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<td>(1.0001)</td>
<td>(1.0424)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Taxation (Taxes as % GDP) $t$-1</td>
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<td>.1702**</td>
<td>.1112</td>
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<td>(0.0949)</td>
<td>(0.0956)</td>
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<td>Sigma se</td>
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<td>N national elections</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>152</td>
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Models are estimated by pooled Tobit and with data from 155 national election years. The table reports Tobit coefficients and standard errors.

* significant at the .10 level; ** significant at the .05 level; ^ Prob. = .11.
Table 2.A. A Summary of the Principal Findings of Table 2 on the Correlates of RRWP Party Success, 1981-2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Globalization and Institutions of Solidarity</th>
<th>Change in RRWP vote Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital Mobility (Liberalization) (_t-1)</td>
<td>2.78*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandize Imports LDC (_t-1)</td>
<td>1.84*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Seekers and Refugees (mean (_t-1) to (_t-3))</td>
<td>4.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection (_t-1)</td>
<td>-4.44**</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Model</th>
<th>Change in RRWP vote Share</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left Libertarian Party Vote (_c-1)</td>
<td>4.99**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taxation (Taxes as % GDP) (_t-1)</td>
<td>2.99**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Support for RRWP Parties (_c-1)</td>
<td>6.04**</td>
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The tables reports the change in RRWP party vote share with a one standard deviation unit change in the explanatory variable; the size of the standard deviation is reported in parentheses.
### Table 3. The Mediation of Globalization’s Effects on RRWP Party Electoral Success by Institutions of Social Solidarity

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Globalization Factor</th>
<th>Capital Mobility $t-1$</th>
<th>Imports LDC $t-1$</th>
<th>Asylum Seekers and Refugees $t-1$ to $t-3$</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mediation of Globalization by Universalistic Social Protection</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Levels of Social Protection $^a$</td>
<td>2.7836*</td>
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<td>5.2251**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.0697*</td>
<td>.1131*</td>
<td>17.3746**</td>
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<td>(.0481)</td>
<td>(.0887)</td>
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<td>High Levels of Social Protection</td>
<td>2.7836*</td>
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<td><strong>Mediation of Globalization by Employment Security Regulation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Levels of Employment Security Regulation $^b$</td>
<td>2.7836*</td>
<td>1.8358*</td>
<td>7.4785**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.0697*</td>
<td>.1131*</td>
<td>24.4486**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0481)</td>
<td>(.0887)</td>
<td>(8.5168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Levels of Employment Security Regulation</td>
<td>2.7836*</td>
<td>1.8358*</td>
<td>.3642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.0697*</td>
<td>.1131*</td>
<td>1.2232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0481)</td>
<td>(.0887)</td>
<td>(8.5368)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediation of Globalization by Union Organization</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Levels of Union Organization $^c$</td>
<td>4.7408*</td>
<td>1.8358*</td>
<td>7.6109**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.1190*</td>
<td>.1131*</td>
<td>24.9777**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.0805)</td>
<td>(.0887)</td>
<td>(4.1498)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.8358*</td>
<td>.9502</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>.0502</td>
<td>.1131*</td>
<td>(3.1184)</td>
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<td>(.0620)</td>
<td>(.0887)</td>
<td>(7.7065)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table reports marginal effects derived from interactions between globalization factors on the one hand, and institutions of social solidarity on the other. The first and second parameter estimates in each cell are the regression coefficient and Tobit coefficient, respectively; the regression coefficient is expressed as the change in RRWP party vote share associated with a one standard deviation unit change in the globalization variable at low and high levels of the focal institutional context. The third number is the Tobit coefficient’s asymptotic standard error.

Interactions are estimated in basic model reported in Table 2. (Full interactions results presented in the online Appendix).

$^a$ Low Universalistic Social Protection (Austria, Spain in the 1990s); high universalistic social protection (Denmark, Finland, Sweden in the 2000s).

$^b$ Low Employment Security (Belgium, Switzerland in the 1990s); high employment security (Greece, Spain in the 1990s).

$^c$ Low Union Organization (Britain, Greece in the 1990s); high union organization (Nordic countries in the 2000s)

* significant at the .10 level; ** significant at the .05 level
Figure 1. The Electoral Impact of Asylum Seekers and Refugees Across Levels of Union Organization. a

a Change in Asylum Seekers and Refugees is expressed as one standard deviation unit of the variable in the sample of 16 nation-1981 to 2015 national election years, or .11 percent of the national population. Union organization is expressed as a standard (z-)score index. See Appendix for more details.